A hazard analysis via an improved timed colored petri net with time–space coupling safety constraint  by Li, Zelin et al.
Chinese Journal of Aeronautics, (2016), 29(4): 1027–1041Chinese Society of Aeronautics and Astronautics
& Beihang University
Chinese Journal of Aeronautics
cja@buaa.edu.cn
www.sciencedirect.comA hazard analysis via an improved timed colored
petri net with time–space coupling safety constraint* Corresponding author. Tel.: +86 10 82313598.
E-mail address: wangshihai@buaa.edu.cn (S. Wang).
Peer review under responsibility of Editorial Committee of CJA.
Production and hosting by Elsevier
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cja.2016.04.016
1000-9361  2016 Chinese Society of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Li Zelin, Wang Shihai *, Zhao Tingdi, Liu BinScience and Technology on Reliability and Environmental Engineering Laboratory, School of Reliability and Systems
Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100083, ChinaReceived 15 September 2015; revised 16 February 2016; accepted 19 March 2016






constantAbstract Petri nets are graphical and mathematical tools that are applicable to many systems for
modeling, simulation, and analysis. With the emergence of the concept of partitioning in time and
space domains proposed in avionics application standard software interface (ARINC 653), it has
become difﬁcult to analyze time–space coupling hazards resulting from resource partitioning using
classical or advanced Petri nets. In this paper, we propose a time–space coupling safety constraint
and an improved timed colored Petri net with imposed time–space coupling safety constraints
(TCCP-NET) to ﬁll this requirement gap. Time–space coupling hazard analysis is conducted in
three steps: speciﬁcation modeling, simulation execution, and results analysis. A TCCP-NET is
employed to model and analyze integrated modular avionics (IMA), a real-time, safety-critical
system. The analysis results are used to verify whether there exist time–space coupling hazards at
runtime. The method we propose demonstrates superior modeling of safety-critical real-time
systems as it can specify resource allocations in both time and space domains. TCCP-NETs can
effectively detect underlying time–space coupling hazards.
 2016 Chinese Society of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
With the development of computer and software technology
and incremental increases in reliability, availability, and safety
requirements for safety-critical real-time systems, the concept
of partitioning in time and space domains is proposed inavionics application standard software interface (ARINC
653).1 Multiple applications of different software levels share
resources and are hosted on one common hardware platform.
Applications are isolated by time and space partitioning to
efﬁciently prevent fault propagation. Current operating
systems with the ARINC 653 standard include: VxWorks653,
LynxOS-178, and Integrity-178B. This paper will introduce
time–space coupling safety issues in resource conﬁgurations
mainly based on an integrated modular avionics (IMA)
system.
An IMA architecture provides a shared platform with
reusable and ﬂexible hardware and software resources.2 By
replacing numerous separate, centralized common
processing modules, IMA architectures beneﬁt from low
Table 1 Interpretations of places and transitions.11
Input place Transition Output place
Required resources Tasks Freed resources
Input data Computations Output data
Input signals Signals processing Output signals
Buﬀers/registers Processors Buﬀers/registers
1028 Z. Li et al.power consumption and maintenance savings, but bring with
them potential safety issues.3 The platform can host avionics
functions of various safety levels while ensuring the integrity
of the system through its robust partitioning mechanism. Time
and space partitioning is the core concept of an IMA system.
This type of partitioning requires adequate temporal resources
(time slots) and spatial resources (memory space) to be allo-
cated to each partition in the design phase in order to ensure
proper execution and satisfy real-time constraint requirements.
System designers usually conﬁgure time slots and memory
space of each partition separately, ignoring time–space
dynamic connection requirements between partition resources,
which are heavy, complicated, and error-prone.4 Spatial
resource requirements of applications vary from and can be
affected by their allocated temporal resources. The interactive
relationship between temporal and spatial resources introduces
new safety issues.
Petri nets (PNs) were ﬁrst introduced in the doctoral disser-
tation, ‘‘Communication with Automata”, of Carl Adam
Petri.5 PNs are an information ﬂow model of network struc-
ture with parallelism, uncertainty and synchronism. PNs pro-
vide formal methods to establish mathematical models that
can describe system behaviors and also provide a graphical
interface that helps system modeling and analysis.6 PNs have
been proven to be effective graphical, mathematical modeling
and analysis tools that are widely used to model asynchronous,
concurrent computer systems. PNs have been expanded and
contain different features and functions for speciﬁc modeling
purposes such as timed PNs7, colored PNs8, and hierarchy
PNs.9 For analyzing time–space coupling hazards in safety-
critical real-time systems, all of these current methods seem
unsatisfactory. To deal with resource coupling in a time–space
domain, this paper proposes a time–space coupling safety con-
straint. Furthermore, a new, timed colored Petri net with time–
space coupling safety constraints (TCCP-NET) is introduced
and employed for time–space coupling hazard analysis.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 – a brief intro-
duction of classical PNs, colored PNs, timed PNs, their mod-
eling and analysis methods, and limitations. An IMA system,
as an example, is introduced to illustrate the concept of
time–space partitioning where time–space coupling hazards
are possibly introduced; Section 3 – speciﬁcations of time–
space coupling and time–space coupling safety constraints;
Section 4 – a new, timed colored PN is proposed with time–
space coupling safety constraints. Its modeling process and
analysis methods are introduced; Section 5 – a case study
and discussion are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed modeling and analysis methods; Section 6 – con-




A classical PN10 has two different types of nodes: places
(circles), transitions (rectangles). The different nodes are
connected by directed arcs (arrows). A place can contain any
number of tokens, and the distribution of tokens over places
is called a marking, which represents the allocation of
resources. If all input places connected to a transition havemore than one token, that transition can be ﬁred. Tokens in
input places are removed and tokens are generated in output
places. Any transition in a PN may be ﬁred concurrently if it
is enabled. Due to uncertainty and concurrency, there are
many distributions of tokens that represent various markings.
In the modeling process, the state of a system is generally
denoted by places, and behaviors that change system state
are denoted by transitions. Some typical interpretations of
transitions and their input places and output places are shown
in Table 1.
Complex behaviors in the system can be modeled by a
classical PN. The model is then used to analyze behavioral
and structural properties of the system.12 However, a number
of limitations exist in this type of PN:
(1) All tokens are identical and descriptions of resource
types are too simple.
(2) It is difﬁcult for existing attributes in PNs to describe
additional system properties.
(3) The concept of time is not taken into consideration in
the modeling and simulation process.
2.1.2. Timed PN
The timed PN (TP-NET)13 is derived from classic PNs. It mod-
els interactions between activities, taking into account time
properties. Time is introduced into a TP-NET in different
ways:
(1) Time associated with tokens. Each token is associated
with a time value that indicates when the token is avail-
able to ﬁre a transition.
(2) Time associated with arcs. Each arc is associated with a
delay t, which indicates a token takes t time to travel
between two nodes.
(3) Time associated with transitions. Each transition can be
associated with a delay t or delay interval [start, end],
which represents time required to ﬁre a transition.
With such time properties, TP-NETs have been widely used
for modeling and performance evaluation, especially in real-
time systems.14–16
The structure of a TP-NET is Ntimed ¼ ðP;T;A;W;M0; IÞ,
where N ¼ ðP;T;A;W;M0Þ, a marked PN. Symbols P, T, A,
and W represent places, transitions, arcs and initial marking
respectively. IðtÞ denotes ﬁring time of a transition and is called
the ﬁring time function.
The TP-NET speciﬁes how much time an individual
operation takes and how long it is necessary wait before it is
ready. In TP-NETs, powerful time properties can help model
time-dependent system behaviors that can be used in simula-
tion to analyze problems in a time domain.
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A colored PN (CP-NET) is a tuple Ncolored ¼
ðP;T;A;R;C;N;E;G; IÞ17, which preserves existing properties
of PNs and adds modeling formalism to distinguish between
different tokens. Deﬁnition of these symbols can refer to
Ref.17 CP-NETs provide graphical notations and basic primi-
tives to construct concurrent, synchronous, and communicat-
ing models.18 Tokens in places can be assigned a data value
consisting of a simple number, string, or data structure. This
value is called token color and its type is called a color set,
which it is identical to data type in programming languages.
When a PN is used to model a system, tokens often repre-
sent objects or resources in those systems. These resources may
have attributes that are not easily represented by a simple
token. For example, Fig. 1 shows simple resource utilization.
The ﬁrst place p1 has three resources (Resource 1, Resource
2, and Resource 3). Although both Channels A and B have
the same model, and the three resources are similarly identical,
they are distinct in that Resource 1 must use Channel A, while
Resource 3 must use Channel B. Resource 2 can use either
Channel A or Channel B.
A CP-NET can model similar systems according to their
speciﬁcation. System behaviors can be analyzed either by
means of simulation or occurrence graphs. It is very efﬁcient
to model resource allocation and analyze problems in a space
domain using CP-NETs.
In general, TP-NETs are used to analyze the time-dependent
behaviors of a system, such as scheduling analysis in real-time
systems. In Ref.19, PNs with imposed timing constraints are
employed to analyze schedulability with the assumption that
resources are always available and adequate upon request.
CP-NETs are used to analyze problems in resource allocations,
especially for shared or dedicated resources.6 It is worth noting
that current PNs are only used to analyze either time-dependent
behaviors of a system or resource allocations. They appear to
be incapable of analyzing the problems caused by interactions
between temporal resources and spatial resources, called
time–space coupling safety issues.
2.2. IMA system
2.2.1. IMA architectures
Fig. 2 shows the typical three-layer structure deﬁned by
ARINC 653:20 the application layer, operating system layer,Fig. 1 Using a CP-NET to model shared resource utilization.and support layer. ARINC 653 deﬁnes the application inter-
face (API) and partitioning to decouple shared process plat-
forms, namely, application software and operating system.
Operating systems and hardware can be isolated.
Essentially, the main objective of the IMA system is to
extend the ﬂexibility of a distributed architecture to support
different safety-critical programs. The task scheduling of dis-
tributed real-time system not only satisﬁes the basic require-
ments of distributed system scheduling, but also ensures each
task can be completed at a determined time. Based on this
IMA structure, a hierarchical scheduling model is introduced
for resource partitioning and task scheduling in IMA sys-
tems.21 In the operating system layer, time slice rotation is
employed to activate each partition. All processes of a parti-
tion are scheduled according to their pre-determined task pri-
orities within the time slots of each partition, as shown in
Fig. 3. In this model, there are two schedulers of different lay-
ers. One is responsible for the cyclic scheduling of partitions in
IMA systems, and the other is used to schedule tasks in an acti-
vated partition within assigned time slots.22
2.2.2. Time and space partitioning
In the ARINC 653 standard, the partition is the core concept
and the unit of scheduling and resource allocation, including
time and space partitioning.23,24 The computing resources
are shared between applications via time and space partition-
ing. Partitions with different critical levels can be executed in
the same module due to a robustly partitioned architecture.25
Space partitioning provides a runtime environment where
different critical applications can run concurrently on the same
computing platform without spatial resource conﬂicts.26
Memory areas in different partitions are protected from
unauthorized access from other partitions by space
partitioning mechanisms. In this framework, the memory space
of each partition has its own logical address into which pro-
cesses, data, and resources are placed. They cannot be occupied
or interrupted by applications running in other partitions.
With time partitioning, a guaranteed portion of CPU time
can be allocated to each partitioned application running in theFig. 2 IMA architecture (ARINC 653).
Fig. 3 A hierarchical scheduling model.
1030 Z. Li et al.same module, without regard to other partitions. Each parti-
tion can only acquire computing resources within its time slots.
The system will continue to run processes in other partitions
according to schedule, even if errors occur. The sum of time
slots allocated to each partition in one cycle forms a major
time frame27 (MTF) as shown in Fig. 4.
Space partitioning implies that a partition has exclusive
access to its own resources, like memory and buffers. With
space partitioning, an application can be protected from any
erroneous behavior of other applications while sharing the
same resources. Time partitioning guarantees a partition’s
monopoly on the use of a pre-allocated processing time with-
out any interference from other partitions. The expected ben-
eﬁts of time and space partitioning are explained as follows:
(1) Applications can be developed separately, regardless of
the underlying hardware; different safety-critical soft-
ware can be integrated into a common processing plat-
form, which does not reduce system reliability or safety.
(2) Resources (computing, communication and input/out-
put) are shared by hosted functions and utilization is
improved, thus weight, power consumption, and volume
are signiﬁcantly reduced.
Applications in partitions communicate with each other
whether they run on the same module or not. A message can
be sent from a single partition to one or more others through
channels, logical links between communication partitions. A
channel has one or more distinct end points called ports. Each
individual port has two modes of operation: sampling mode or
queuing mode.
In sampling mode, a message in the source port is refreshed
by updated data with identical structure, and remains untilFig. 4 Time partitioning structure.transmitted or overwritten by a new occurrence of the mes-
sage. Destination ports can only access the latest message
received. In queuing mode, a message will not be overwritten
during transmission by any new message sent on the same
channel. When a message reaches the destination port, it is
not consumed by the partition, but stored in a message queue.
Messages should be transmitted from source port to destina-
tion port without data loss.
In order to have successful communication between parti-
tions, attributes of each port should be conﬁgured properly.
Port attributes are shown in Table 2. The name of each port
is unique to distinguish between them. Data in a message can-
not exceed the maximum message size otherwise the integrity
and correctness of the data are not fully guaranteed. All ports
can operate in only one direction and cannot be used for bidi-
rectional transmission. In queuing mode, the number of mes-
sages should be less than the maximum indicated.
In all cases, applications should allocate enough memory
space to ensure maximum receipt of messages regardless of
application protocol. Each communication node is considered
to be conﬁgured to deﬁne resource allocation and operational
mode of the port. It is worth noting that attributes and oper-
ational mode of each port cannot be changed at run-time.
2.2.3. Configuration methods
Resource allocation in IMA systems consists of spatial
resources (memory, bandwidth) and temporal resources (time
slots).
Allocation policy of temporal resources is derived from task
scheduling algorithms. Scheduling is the essence of temporal
resource allocation, and the time constraints of a task are
emphasized in real-time task scheduling systems. In general,
real-time scheduling algorithms are classiﬁed according to dif-
ferent criteria; Table 3 shows one such classiﬁcation for real-
time systems.
Task scheduling algorithms widely used in real-time sys-
tems include rate-monotonic (RM), earliest deadline ﬁrst
(EDF), and least slack time (LST) scheduling.28 A set of tasks
is considered to be schedulable only if all tasks can be invoked
and executed within the given time. For the set of tasks
Ttask ¼ fttask1; ttask2; . . . ; ttaskng, Eq. (1) is the precondition for
being schedulable. Otherwise, the set of tasks Ttask cannot be




ðci=TriÞ 6 1 ð1Þ
where U is processor utilization, ci is computation time, and Tri
is release period.Table 2 Port attributes.
Port type Name Deﬁnition
Sampling
port
Name The name of the port
Max message size Maximum message size
Direction Source or destination
Name The name of the port
Queuing port Max message size Maximum message size





Table 3 Real-time scheduling algorithm classiﬁcation.
Classiﬁcation criteria Classiﬁcation result
The order of task executions Static or dynamic
Whether the task can be preempted Pre-emptive or non-pre-emptive
The system operating environment Uniprocessor or multiprocessor
System architecture Centralized or distributed
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RM scheduling algorithms assign tasks to a ﬁxed priority:
tasks with the shortest cycle duration receive the highest prior-
ity. RM has been proven to be an optimal static priority algo-
rithm. A set of tasks, which can be scheduled properly using
arbitrary ﬁxed priority scheduling algorithms, must also be
schedulable using RM algorithms. Because RM scheduling
algorithms are static, they have weak adaptability and ﬂexibil-
ity at runtime.
EDF is a dynamic priority scheduling algorithm, also
known as the deadline driven scheduling algorithm.30 EDF
assigns a priority to a task based on its deadline. When a
new task is ready, the priorities of other tasks may need to
be adjusted to ensure the task with the closest deadline can
be executed ﬁrst. EDF scheduling algorithms have proven to
be optimal for dynamic scheduling on a uniprocessor system
where processor utilization may be up to 100%. When a sys-
tem becomes overloaded instantaneously, however, system
behaviors are unpredictable due to missing prioritization of
tasks. As a result, industrial real-time systems rarely use this
algorithm.
A dynamic priority scheduling algorithm, LST, assigns a
dynamic priority to a task based on its slack time, as intro-
duced in Ref.31. The shorter the slack time of a task, the higher
its priority. LST scheduling algorithms are widely used in
embedded systems.
In Refs.32,33, the scheduling algorithms mainly focus on an
appropriate allocation of resources in the temporal domain.
However, partition memory should also be taken into consid-
eration. Partition memory resources are usually allocated in
terms of engineering experience, and then modiﬁed repeatedly
until debugging is successful. In Ref.34, the constraint-based
allocation approach is proposed to help allocate avionics
resources for system implementation while ensuring safety
requirements. In this approach, resource allocation is consid-
ered as a traditional combination of software and hardware,
and the interactive relationship between temporal and spatial
resources is not pointed out as a safety constraint.
When an integrator completes the conﬁguration of time
slots and partition memory, the partition applications are
considered to be running properly. If there exists a high degree
of data sharing, such as inter-partition communications,
temporal resources (time slots) and spatial resources (partition
memory) interact, and should not be analyzed separately with
respect to resource allocation. Although partition conﬁgura-
tions are considered appropriate, they may actually raise a
time–space coupling hazard in safety-critical software systems.
None of the reviewed literature discussed an analysis of time–
space dynamic connections in the allocation of temporal spa-
tial resources. Therefore, at the conclusion of this paper, we
propose a modeling and analysis approach with time–space
coupling safety constraints to improve hazard analysis of par-
tition conﬁgurations.3. Time–space coupling safety constraints
Real-time operating systems compliant with ARINC 653 are an
important part of safety-critical real-time systems. The system
architecture supplies a shared and common computing platform
that hosts multiple applications of different criticalities. It pro-
vides beneﬁts of ﬂexibility and scalability and allows applica-
tions to be developed independently. Complexity is increased
due to high integrity and the sharing of resources. Robust par-
titioning can effectively limit or isolate different avionics appli-
cations. Interface control helps us thoroughly understand
interactions between applications that are not eliminated by
partitioning. Robust partitioning and interface control facilitate
application integration and hazard analysis techniques.
Although interactions between applications and data shar-
ing are a necessary and desirable property of IMA systems,
they introduce some safety issues as well. Spatial resource
requirements of applications vary from and may be affected
by their allocated temporal resources. The interaction between
the temporal spatial resources is called resource coupling in a
time–space domain. In systems theory, safety is considered
as a system control problem rather than a component reliabil-
ity problem.35 Accidents resulting from interactions among
system components occur due to a lack of adequate constraints
imposed on components and system behaviors. In Ref.36,
segregation constraints (spatial and temporal) and a mixed-
integer linear programming formulation are employed to
obtain suitable allocation of resources. The current methods
only focus on either temporal resources or spatial resources,
which is limiting with respect to time–space dynamic connec-
tions. We propose a time–space coupling safety constraint
and then employ a TCCP-NET with it to improve hazard
analysis.
The time–space coupling safety constraint imposed on the
allocation of resources in real-time systems is:
The spatial resources allocated to a system or application
should satisfy the combined requirements of the time resources
and internal properties of the system, for instance, the average
speed of data generation.
The constraint can be expressed by formula:
Ttem i  ki 6 Sspa i; 8pi 2 P ð2Þ
where the ith application pi is allocated temporal resources
Ttem i and spatial resources Sspa i. The effect on spatial
resources from temporal resources is set to the impact factor
ki. P is a set of applications pi. The combined relationship of
the time resources and internal properties of the system is
denoted by the  operator.
This constraint reveals the relationship between the spatial
and temporal resources. With the time–space coupling safety
constraint in a TCCP-NET, an improved method can be used
to analyze resource conﬁgurations concerning time–space
1032 Z. Li et al.dynamics. For a better understanding of this constraint, an
IMA system example is given to illustrate its speciﬁc forms.
We assume that each task in every partition arrives period-
ically and needs to send data at a certain rate. Each partition pi
has invocation period Tper i, and execution duration Di. Each
channel is assigned to a memory size Mij. Internal property
ki is replaced with data generation rate Vij. i and j are the
source and destination partition of the channel respectively.
Each partition pi is considered to produce data incessantly
within its execution duration Di. Memory size Mij should sat-
isfy the requirements of the data amount generated within exe-
cution duration Di. The  operator is instantiated by
multiplication, so Eq. (2) is accommodated as follows:
Di  Vij 6Mij ð3Þ
Eq. (3) is an exact constraint for IMA system resource con-
ﬁgurations. It will be added into a TCCP-NET as a guarding
function to help analyze potential time–space coupling haz-
ards. For other real-time systems, the internal properties of
the system may change. Eq. (2) should be modiﬁed to accom-
modate such properties.4. Modeling and analysis using TCCP-NET
A TCCP-NET based on an extension of colored PNs is pro-
posed that can specify the conﬁgurations on temporal and spa-
tial resources in terms of time slots and physical memory
characteristics. Based on this model, an improved safety anal-
ysis method with a coupling safety constraint in time and space
domains is introduced. An example IMA system demonstrates
how to analyze time–space coupling hazards by using the
TCCP-NET. Notably, time–space coupling hazard analysis
of IMA systems is about temporal and spatial resource alloca-
tion of partitions, and its impact on inter-partition behaviors.
In TCCP-NET models, a global clock is introduced to rep-
resent the model time, which may be either discrete or contin-
uous. More speciﬁcally, the basic properties of TCCP-NET
include colored tokens, arc expression functions, guarding
functions, and time attributes. Each token has a color and a
time value. Colored tokens can distinguish different resource
instances, such as data storage space and channel memory size.
A time value of each token represents the earliest time when
the token is ready. The routing of different tokens is controlled
by arc expression and guarding functions. Delay time interval
required for implementing a transition is denoted by the time
attribute in each transition.
In this section, the deﬁnition and the modeling process of
TCCP-NET are discussed in detail.
4.1. TCCP-NET definition
A TCCP-NET is a multi-element structure deﬁned as
TCCP-NET ¼ ðR;P;T;A;N;C;G;E;TF;IÞ, where
(1) R is the type of non-empty ﬁnite set, called a color set,
which indicates the type of tokens in each place;
(2) P ¼ fp1; p2; p3; . . . ; png. Where P is a collective notation
of a ﬁnite set of places, pn denotes nth place;
(3) T ¼ ft1; t2; . . . ; tmg. T is a ﬁnite set of transitions, m is the
number of transitions, P \ T ¼£ and P [ T –£;(4) A# ðP  T Þ [ ðT  P Þ. A is a ﬁnite set of directed arcs
(ﬂow relations) and P \ A ¼ T \ A ¼£;
(5) N : A ! ðP  T Þ [ ðT  P Þ. N is a node function. Direc-
ted arcs are mapped from A to ðP  T Þ [ ðT  PÞ;
(6) C : P ! R or T ! R. C is a color function. Each place pi
is mapped to a type CðpiÞ, and each transition ti is
mapped to a type CðtiÞ by color function, which means
that each place or transition should have its own set of
colors;
(7) G : T ! Expressions, 9t; t 2 T ; then TypeðGðtÞÞ ¼ B\
TypeðVarðGðtÞÞÞ. G a is guarding function, TypeðvÞ is
the type of variable v, VarðExprÞ is variable set of the
expression and B is a boolean function;
(8) E :A!Expression:8a;a2A;then TypeðEðaÞÞ¼CðpiÞMS\
TypeðVarðEðaÞÞÞ. E is an arc function, pi is the place of
NðaÞ and CðpiÞMS is all the sets of CðpiÞ;
(9) TFðtiÞ ¼ fT del1; T del2; . . . ; T del ig. TF is a time delay set of
corresponding transitions, T del i is the time delay of tran-
sition ti;
(10) I : P ! startedExpression. I is an initial function. Each
place pi is mapped into an expression by the initial
function I;
In a TCCP-NET, time concepts and guarding functions are
employed. The conditions where transition ti can be enabled
are modiﬁed and speciﬁc requirements are as follows:
(1) The total number of tokens in place Input should not be
less than the number of tokens required by binding ele-
ments. 8pi 2 t;Eðpi; tiÞhbindingi 6 MðpiÞ.
(2) The timestamp should be ready. The value of times-
tamps carried by binding tokens should be less than or
equal to the current model time.
(3) Guarding function is satisﬁed. GðtiÞhbi ¼ true.
In our model, there are some modiﬁcations on our
TCCP-NET from the original CP-NET that improve the
ability of TCCP-NET to analyze resource conﬁguration in
real-time systems. More details are as follows:
(1) Directed arcs are mapped from A to ðP  T Þ [ ðT  PÞ.
Each arc is mapped into a pair, where the ﬁrst element
is called the source node, and the second element is called
the destination node. The source node and destination
node must be different types (places or transitions). More
than one arc between the same pair of nodes can exist in a
TCCP-NET as multi-arcs. This helps model resource
utilizations in different channels or modes.
(2) Each transition t is mapped to an expression by guard-
ing functions. All variable types in the expression are
part of the color set R, and the result of the expression
is boolean. Transitions can be implemented only when
the guarding function returns a true value. Resource
constraints (temporal or spatial) can be added into
guarding functions to restrict system behaviors. The
time–space coupling safety constraint is added into
TCCP-NET as a guarding function.
(3) Each arc is mapped into an expression by an arc func-
tion. All variable types in the expression are part of
the color set R, and the value of the expression is a
multi-set. Arc expression determines the token types
Fig. 5 Partition conﬁguration.
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The @+ operator in arc expressions specify a delay time
required to transfer between nodes. In general, arc
expressions are essential.
(4) Each transition ti is given a transition delay
TFðtiÞ ¼ T del i. When the transition is ready, T del i is
needed before implementing the transition ti. For
ti 2 T , if TFðtiÞ ¼ T del i ¼ 0; there is no time delay
needed for a ready transition. Such transitions are called
instant transitions and other transitions are referred to
as timed transitions. A resource occupancy time interval
can be denoted by a transition delay.
The execution of a TCCP-NET model is time driven. Sys-
tem time starts at 0 and all transitions are searched for those
that can ﬁre. When these transitions are executed completely,
the system clock is increased by a time unit. The next step is
to search for transitions that can ﬁre at the current time and
execute them, and then increase the system clock by a time unit
again. The above steps are repeated until the system clock is
equal to the set value. In the end, the developed model is sim-
ulated; Time–space coupling hazards can be detected through
simulation results.
In the TCCP-NET, a value is attached to every token, the
token color, which distinguishes them from each other. In addi-
tion, the time concept is involved in tokens, transitions, and
arcs. The time stamp of each token indicates the time at which
the token is ready to be consumed. The delay time in both tran-
sitions and arcs denotes the time interval required for corre-
sponding operations. Guarding functions are used to further
constrain ﬁring rules. A transition is considered to be enabled
when it satisﬁes the requirements of the general enabling rules.
In addition, the binding element also must be ready (i.e. the
time stamp of corresponding tokens should not exceed the cur-
rent model clock) and the value of guarding function must be
true. Hence we are able to utilize these extended features to
model a system with coupling in time and space domains, such
as partition conﬁgurations in IMA systems.
4.2. Modeling process based on TCCP-NET
To demonstrate the modeling approach for TCCP-NET
clearly, an example of a simple IMA conﬁguration is
employed. IMA architecture may consist of one or more mod-
ules connected with each other using a time division multiplex-
ing communication bus such as ARINC 659 and AFDX. Each
core module has one or more processors. Several execution
partitions, P ¼ fp1; p2; . . . ; png, run on a processor and are
scheduled on statically predeﬁned and ﬁxed time slots within
a major time frame. Applications are allocated to correspond-
ing partitions. Each partition pi has a period Tper i, duration
Di, and offset Oi relative to the start of the MTF. Each parti-
tion invocation must complete its computation and send outTable 4 Partition parameter set.
Partition Period (ms) Duration (ms) Oﬀset (ms)
p1 20 4 0
p2 30 2 4
p3 40 3 8the resulting messages before the next invocation of the same
partition.
Details of the partition conﬁguration are given in Table 4.
Each partition pi has an invocation period Tper i, duration Di,
and offset Oi. Each channel is assigned to a memory size Mij
and data generation rate Vij. Partition p1 has two channels.
One is Channel ch12 (p1 ! p2) in which partition p1 sends data
to partition p2 at a rate V12. The other is channel ch13 (p1 ! p3)
in which partition p1 sends data to partition p3 at a rate V13.
As Fig. 5 illustrates, three partitions communicate with
each other. The lines represent communication channels and
the arrows show data ﬂow direction, intuitively distinguishing
between the source and destination of a channel. For example,
Partition 1 has two channels. Both of their sources are Parti-
tion 1, but one destination is Partition 2 and the other is Par-
tition 3.
The length of the MTF is deﬁned as a product of the least
common multiple (LCM) of all partition periods on one
processor,
MTF ¼ k  LCMðTper 1;Tper 2; . . . ;Tper nÞ; k 2 Nþ ð4Þ
In this example, k is assigned 1. Thus, MTF is 120 ms cal-
culated by Eq. (4). If an appropriate time slot conﬁguration
policy exists for a set of partitions, P ¼ fp1; p2; . . . ; png, the fol-
lowing must be satisﬁed:
X
16i6n
Di=Tper i 6 1 ð5Þ
According to Eq. (5)
X
16i63
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The timing requirement is satisﬁed. This MTF structure of
these partitions is shown in Fig. 6. Within this MTF, partitions
p1, p2, and p3 are invoked six, four, and three times respec-
tively. The three partitions are invoked properly in a time
domain as seen in Fig. 6.
To facilitate modeling of partition temporal and spatial
resource conﬁgurations, the following rules are proposed:Channel Memory size Data generation rate
ch12: p1 ! p2 M12 V12
ch13: p1 ! p3 M13 V13
ch23: p2 ! p3 M23 V23
ch32: p3 ! p2 M32 V32
Fig. 6 A major time frame (MTF).
1034 Z. Li et al.(1) The places represent states of system behaviors that can
be divided into two parts. The ﬁrst is state of system
scheduling, including Inactive, Dispatched, Compute,
and Finish. The second is state of system communica-
tions, including Unused, Send, and Arrival. Deﬁned
color sets indicate the resource type of each place (i.e.
partition or message) and colored tokens describe speci-
ﬁc resource information in a place. The time stamp of
each token in one place represents the time whenFig. 7 A partition coresources arrive in this place, and also indicates the ear-
liest time the token can be used. Initial function I deﬁnes
initial time stamp invoked in place, which represents the
offset of partitions (i.e. O1;O2;O3).
(2) Directed Arcs connecting places and transitions
represent ﬂow direction of tokens. An arc expression
deﬁnes resource types that can go through channels. A
delay time (the @+ operator) in arc expression
represents the time interval for its next invocation in a
corresponding partition (i.e. partition invocation period,
T per 1; T per 2; T per 3).
(3) Transitions represent behaviors that impel state changes.
A transition duration (the @+ operator) denotes parti-
tion execution duration Di.
(4) The time–space coupling safety constraint (3) is added
by guarding functions into the transition that denotes
communication behavior.
A graphic model for an IMA system is shown in Fig. 7
based on the proposed rules of modeling. The four types ofnﬁguration model.
A hazard analysis via an improved timed colored petri net with time–space coupling safety constraint 1035elements in a TCCP-NET are: places (drawn as ellipses), tran-
sitions (drawn as rectangular boxes), arcs (drawn as directed
lines), and tokens (drawn in rounded rectangles).It has thirteen
places and eight transitions, and can be divided into upper and
lower parts. The upper part refers to the temporal resources of
each partition and the lower part describes inter-partition com-
munication behavior. The time–space coupling safety con-
straint is added into transitions as a guarding function. The
color set, which is marked around each place, expresses the
type of tokens in the place. The color set is deﬁned as a group
of the form {hi, p, ch, xi, hi, p, xi}. Color symbol p, an enumer-
ated type, represents individual partition pk in the IMA sys-
tem. Color symbol i, an integral type, denotes the number of
times partition pk has been invoked. The time of arrival at each
intermediate state of partition pk is recorded by color symbol
x, a real type. Color symbol ch represents the channel in which
data can be transmitted. The token in color set Partition rep-
resents the number of invocations and current time of partition
pk, while the token in color set Mestime records the arrival
time of the message generated by the ith invocation of parti-
tion pk. Diverse tokens in a place represent different types of
resources. Transitions with a time function represent the time
required for transition between states, and the binding ele-
ments in each transition only allow particular tokens to be
passed. The time–space coupling safety constraint (3) is added
to guarding functions as a boolean expression, such as
Gðch1 to 3Þ : D1  V13 6M13. Transitions with bolded marks
indicate that these transitions can be ﬁred at the current time.
Initially there are three partitions ready for invocation, rep-
resented by three tokens (p1, p2, and p3) in place Inactive. The
place Invocator, which has three tokens with different time
stamps, activates invocations of the three partitions. For
instance, the token with color (1, p1) and time stamp 0 denotes
that partition p1 is to be invoked when the system clock is at 0
and it is time for the ﬁrst invocation. Once activated, a parti-
tion receives data as input from place Arrival and then pro-
duces data in place Send as output after computation.
Guarding functions are added into transitions that connect
place Send and place Arrival. Arc expressions, and binding ele-
ments restrict the tokens that go through these transitions.
Transition ch1 to 3, for instance, has the binding element
ch = ch13, which denotes that only the tokens that contain
the color ch13 are allowed to pass. In addition, tokens are fur-
ther restricted in terms of data size by the time–space coupling
safety constraint, D1  V13 6M13 added into transition ch1 to
3, as guarding function. Places with color set MesTime record
all data used to analyze the time–space coupling hazards in
communication behaviors including arriving time, arrival
times, and data size. A partition that is invoked and running
on a platform has sole access to computing resources. Thus
a place with color set CPU is introduced to represent comput-
ing resources, which can help verify correctness of temporal
resources for each partition.Fig. 8 ASM structure.5. A case study of TCCP-NET
5.1. Case description
Here, a case study on an IMA system will be introduced.
Aircraft sensor management (ASM) regulates and directsairborne sensors, including processing of millimeter-wave
radar, infrared and other sensor state information, cockpit
controls, and commands to relevant sensors. ASM, with lim-
ited sensor resources, can satisfy multiple demands for target-
ing and scanning of space to obtain the optimum value of
speciﬁc features (such as the detection probability, probability
of intercept, track precision or loss probability), greatly reduc-
ing both the physical and psychological burden of pilots. ASM
systems consist of ﬁve applications and each application runs
on an individual partition. There are many data and control
signal ﬂow transitions between the ﬁve applications. Fig. 8
shows an intuitive ASM structure, including ports, channels,
and data ﬂow directions. In Fig. 8, partition p1 receives sensor
data from partitions p2 and p3, and then sends status data to
the bus. Partition p4 sends control data to partition p2 and par-
tition p3. Partition p5 receives sensor data from partitions p2
and p3, and then sends target detection data to the bus.
In conﬁguration tables, every application is pre-assigned to
an appropriate temporal resource and spatial resource, and
allocated resources cannot be changed at runtime. For exam-
ple, invocation period Tper 1 and execution duration D1 of
partition p1 are set to 100 ms and 20 ms respectively. The port,
which transfers data from partition p1 to the bus at the aver-
age speed of data generation V1, is assigned to port memory
size M1. Resource allocation of all partitions is given in
Table 5.
In the ideal case, each partition is expected to run without
interruption or preemption to reduce time spent repeatedly
switching between application pending and reuse. For limited
allocated temporal resources, applications cannot be ﬁnished
at once, but have to be divided into several slots to meet
real-time requirements. In this case, the duration of partition
p1 is divided into two 10 ms slots. Offset allocation to time win-
dows for the ﬁve partitions is shown in Table 6.
The Gantt chart in Fig. 9 is drawn to describe partition
schedulability according to allocated temporal resources of
each partition. Partition p1 has two slots for each period and
four slots within the major time frame. Partitions p2, p3 and
p4 have two slots and partition p5 has one slot within the major
time frame.
Table 5 Resource allocation for ASM.
Partition Period (103 s) Duration (103 s) Channel Memory size (MB) Data generation rate (103 MB/s)
p1 100 20 ch1B: p1 ! BUS M1 = 10 V1 = 0.45
p2 100 10
ch21: p2 ! p1 M21 = 4 V21 = 0.15
ch25: p2 ! p5 M25 = 4 V25 = 0.20
p3 100 30
ch31: p3 ! p1 M31 = 16 V31 = 0.50
ch35: p3 ! p5 M35 = 16 V35 = 0.65
p4 100 20
ch42: p4 ! p2 M42 = 6 V42 = 0.20
ch43: p4 ! p3 M43 = 6 V43 = 0.25













Fig. 9 An MTF for ASM.
1036 Z. Li et al.5.2. Modeling and simulation
After an IMA function speciﬁcation is given, resource schedul-
ing in a temporal domain should be analyzed ﬁrst. According
to Eq. (5), the precondition to be schedulable is:
X
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This partition time allocation satisﬁes the precondition for
feasible partition scheduling. Using existing scheduling analy-
sis tools29,30 for integrated modular avionics systems, these
partition applications can be scheduled easily.
Following the proposed modeling rules, we can use the
TCCP-NET to model this IMA function according to speciﬁ-
cations. Here, the TCCP-NET model is built up as shown in
Fig. 10. From the TCCP-NET model, transitions in bold indi-
cate that their corresponding tokens can ﬁre. The time–space
coupling safety constraint from Eq. (3) is added as guarding
function in corresponding transitions. In the upper part of this
model, places refer to system intermediate states, includingInactive, Dispatched, Compute, Suspend, Run and Finish.
An additional place, Suspend, is used to describe the mecha-
nism of suspend and resume. The color set of these places is
deﬁned as a group of the form {hi, p, xi}. Color symbol p
(p1, p2, p3, p4, p5) represents different partitions pk (p1, p2, p3,
p4, p5) in the ASM system and color symbol i denotes the num-
ber of times partition pk has been invoked. The time of arrival
at each intermediate states of partition pk is recorded by color
symbol x. In the lower part of this model, places describe the
states where data is generated, sent and received. The color
set of these places is deﬁned as a group of the form {hi, p,
ch, xi}. Color symbol ch limits the channel used to transmit
data. The places Unused and MesTime record arguments that
data is generated and received. Initially there are ﬁve tokens in
place Inactive and eight tokens in place Unused.
Variable types in this model, which denote different types
of resources in each partition, are deﬁned by color sets and
marked around the places. All of the main parameters in this
model are given in Table 7.
When we ﬁnish modeling a real-time system function by
transforming its speciﬁcations along with the time–space cou-
pling safety constraint into a TCC-PN model, the next step is
to simulate the reachability of the model in order to verify
whether there exist time–space coupling hazards at runtime
for given resource allocations (temporal resource and spatial
resource). Because all the released partition invocations within
each MTF have ﬁnished before its next MTF, allocation of
time slots in each MTF is exactly the same. Time–space cou-
pling hazard analysis can be conducted only in one MTF.
The length of the MTF is 200 ms, as calculated by Eq. (4).
MTF ¼ 1  LCMð100; 100; 100; 100; 200Þ ¼ 200 ms
The amount of simulation time is set to 200 ms and the
remaining constant values (port memory sizeMij and data gen-
eration rate Vij) in the TCCP-NET model are given in Table 8.
5.3. Simulation results
For this TCCP-NET model, simulation experiments were per-
formed on CPN Tools,37,18 and system marking after simula-
tion execution for 200 ms are shown in Fig. 11. The model
in Fig. 11 is very similar to that in Fig. 10 because one model
shows the end state of the ﬁrst MTF and while the other dis-
plays the initial state of the second MTF. But, tokens in place
for the two models have changed. The attributes of each place
consist of token type, the number of tokens, and time stamp
(message arrival time). All token records are shown in Table 10.
Tokens in places P1, P2, P3, P5, and BUS record information
Table 7 Declaration of color set and parameters.
Colset P = with p1 | p2 | p3 | p4| p5
Closet CH= with BUS | ch42 | ch43 | ch21 | ch31 | ch35 | ch25 |
ch1B | ch1B
Colset Partition = product INT * P timed;
Colset Mes = product P * CH;
Colset MesAll = product INT * P * CH timed;
Colset MesTime = product INT * P * CH * INT timed;
Colset CPU= with e;
Val IniMes =
10(0, p4, ch42)++10(0, p4, ch43)++10(0, p2, ch21)++10(0, p3,
ch31)
++10(0, p3, ch35)++10(0, p2, ch25)++10(0, p1, ch1B)++10(0,
p5, ch5B);
Val IniPar =
10(0, p1)@20++10(0, p2)@30++10(0, p3)@40++10(0, p4)@0
++10(0, p5)@180;
Guarding functions
G1 = D2 * V21<=M21; G2 = D3 * V31<=M31;
G3 = D4 * V42<=M42; G4 = D1 * V1<=M1;
G5 = D5 * V5<=M5; G6 = D4 * V43<=M43;
G7 = D2 * V25<=M25; G8 = D3 * V35<=M35;
Var p: P Var ch: CH Var i: INT
Table 8 Constant values in TCCP-NET model.
Memory size(MB) Data generation rate(103 MB/s)
M1 = 10 Val V1 = 0.45
M21 = 4 Val V21 = 0.15
M25 = 4 Val V25 = 0.20
M31 = 16 Val V31 = 0.50
M35 = 16 Val V35 = 0.65
M42 = 6 Val V42 = 0.20
M43 = 6 Val V43 = 0.25
M5 = 10 Val V5 = 0.65
Fig. 10 A TCCP-NET model for ASM.
A hazard analysis via an improved timed colored petri net with time–space coupling safety constraint 1037about data that is successfully received. For example, P1 has 2
tokens with color ðp2; ch21Þ transferred from P2 via the transi-
tion ch2 to 1, and 2 tokens with color ðp3; ch31Þ transferred
from P3 via the transition ch3 to 1. The arrival time of the
two tokens with color ðp2; ch21Þ are 40 and 140 respectively.
Tokens in place unused record the number of times data has
been sent. Tokens in place scheduler record the number of
times partitions have been successfully invoked. Partition p5,
for instance, was successfully invoked once and then sent data
to the BUS once. In addition, in an MTF, the number of
Fig. 11 System marking after simulation execution.
1038 Z. Li et al.partition invocations is easily calculated and invocation times
of each partition are listed in Table 9. For example, partition
p1 had been invoked and then sent data to the BUS 2 times.
So place BUS should have 2 tokens with color ðp1;BUSÞ.
By comparing token numbers in places Unused and Sched-
uler in Table 10 and invocation times of each partition in
Table 9, it can be concluded that all of partitions were sched-Table 9 Number of partition invocations.
Partition Period(ms) Invocation times Channel
p1 100 2 ch1B: p1 ! BUS
p2 100 2
ch21: p2 ! p1
ch25: p2 ! p5
p3 100 2
ch31: p3 ! p1
ch35: p3 ! p5
p4 100 2
ch42: p4 ! p2
ch43: p4 ! p3
p5 200 1 ch5B: p5 ! BUSuled as expected and data were successfully sent from each par-
tition. It also veriﬁes the correctness of temporal resource
allocation. On this basis, token attributes in places P1, P2,
P3, P5, and Bus are used to analyze time–space coupling haz-
ards. For example, partition p2 sent data to partitions p1 and p5
via two separate channels 2 times in an MTF. Partition p1 has
2 tokens with color (p2,ch21) and partition p5 has 2 tokens with
color (p2,ch25). Data were successfully transmitted from parti-
tion p2 to partitions p1 and p5. It can be concluded that
resource allocation (temporal resources and spatial resources)
of partition p2 was appropriate. The other four partitions
can be analyzed in the same way. Results show that resource
allocations of partitions p1 and p4 were appropriate, but the
resource allocations of partitions p3 and p5 were inadequate.
Partition p3 had two channels and sent data to partition p1
and p5 respectively 2 times in an MTF. Partition p1 had 2
tokens with color (p3,ch31) and partition p5 had 0 tokens with
color (p3,ch35). Partition p1 received a correct number of data.
Data were successfully transmitted from partition p3 to parti-
tion p1 via the channel (p3 ! p1). However, partition p5 could
not receive messages transmitted from partition p3 via the
channel (p3 ! p5). Messages were not successfully transmitted
Table 10 Simulation results for each place.
Place Token type Token number i Time stamp
P
1 (p2,ch21) 2 @40,140
(p3,ch31) 2 @70,170
P2 (p4,ch42) 2 @20,120
P3 (p4,ch43) 2 @20,120
P5 (p2,ch25) 2 @40,140
















Table 11 Simulation results for each place after
modiﬁcations.
Place Token type Token number (i) Time stamp
P
1 (p2,ch21) 2 @40,140
(p3,ch31) 2 @70,170
P2 (p4,ch42) 2 @20,120
P3 (p4,ch43) 2 @20,120
P
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these data were lost since resource allocation of partition p3
did not satisfy the time–space coupling safety constraint (i.e.
G8 was not satisﬁed. The formula, D3  V35 <¼M35 did not
work). Partition p5 had only one channel and sent data to
the bus one time in an MTF. The place BUS has 0 tokens with
color (p5,ch5B). The bus could not receive data transmitted
from partition p5 via the channel (p5 ! BUS). Resource allo-
cation of partition p5 did not satisfy the time–space coupling
safety constraint (i.e. G5 was not satisﬁed).
5.4. Discussion
Through analysis of the simulation results, it can be concluded
that the resource allocations (temporal resources and spatial
resources) of partition p2, partition p1, and partition p4 are
appropriate. However, resource allocations of partition p3
and partition p5 are inadequate, and a time–space coupling
hazard occurs at runtime.
The technique proposed in Ref.33 presents an optimal allo-
cation policy under the assumption of adequate spatial
resources. It can validate temporal resource allocations (time
slot allocations of partitions) for ASM by simulating the time
slot allocation within one MTF. A constraint-based allocation
approach34 further addresses avionics temporal resource allo-
cation implementation with practical constraints. Still, the
impact of temporal resources on spatial resource requirements
is never taken into consideration, and resource coupling haz-
ards in the time–space domain can barely be detected by exist-
ing methods.
Although temporal resource allocations for ASM have pro-
ven to be feasible and all partitions can be scheduled properly,
due to insufﬁcient spatial resource allocation, some underlying
problems still occur. These issues usually cause data loss and
communication obstruction, which seriously affect the integ-
rity of safety-critical software systems. To solve this problem,we propose using a time–space coupling safety constraint then
employing a TCCP-NET to improve hazard analysis. Two
solutions emerge: If sufﬁcient spatial resources are available,
system speciﬁcations can be modiﬁed to satisfy the require-
ments at runtime. If spatial resources are inadequate or lim-
ited, the amount of generated data should be reduced (e.g.
shortened duration of partition execution) to reduce spatial
resource requirements.
In this case of ASM, the ﬁrst solution is employed, which
increases corresponding spatial resources. Memory size M5
and M35 in Table 8 are adjusted. The values of M5 and M35
are both set as 20 M. System marking after simulation execu-
tion for 200 ms is shown in Table 11.
An identical analysis process was conducted once again.
Partition p5 has 2 tokens with color (p3,ch35), which indicates
that partition p5 successfully received messages transmitted
form partition p3 via the channel (p3 ! p5). Resource alloca-
tion of partition p5 was appropriate. The results show that
all of the partitions can be scheduled properly, and messages
can be successfully transmitted from source to destinations
via the corresponding channels. It can be concluded that both
temporal resource and spatial resource allocations for ASM
are suitable and no time–space coupling hazards exist.
6. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, a time–space coupling safety constraint and a
new TCCP-NET modeling method are proposed for safety-
critical real-time systems with partitioning in time and space
domains. Current conﬁguration methods focus only on tempo-
ral resources or spatial resources independently, which limits
the analysis of time–space dynamic connection requirements.
Time–space coupling hazard analysis is conducted in three
1040 Z. Li et al.steps: speciﬁcation modeling, simulation execution, and results
analysis. The process of modeling and analysis using a TCCP-
NET is demonstrated in detail through the modeling of a
safety-critical function and analysis of underlying time–space
coupling hazards. The results of an ASM case study show
the feasibility and effectiveness of this approach.
The TCCP-NET modeling and analysis method can be
applied to other real-time systems that contain additional
safety constraints (temporal and spatial) on components and
system behaviors. However, when an established model
becomes large and complex, state space size increases dramat-
ically. A corresponding state space explosion would impede
model analysis capability. Therefore, while ongoing work
moves toward expanding potential applicability by adding
more safety constraints into the TCCP-NET model, it should
also strive to simplify the model and minimize state space size.
Finally, a software analysis tool shall be developed for more
users.
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